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Following Lo and MacKinlay’s work on the U.S. market (1988, 1990), this paper
investigates the autocorrelation of the market index and the cross-autocorrelations of size-
sorted portfolios in the Japanese market. The structure of the cross-autocorrelations in the
Japanese market is very similar to that of the U.S. in the sense that there are lead-lag relations
running from larger stocks to smaller stocks, which will create positive autocorrelation in the
market index. Although we have found no autocorrelation in the popular Japanese TOPIX
market index, it is because TOPIX puts much more weight on larger stocks compared to the
CRSP index for the U.S. market. However, such a cross-autocorrelation structure disappeared
during the latter half of the 1990s, as the largest stocks in the Japanese market began to exhibit
negative autocorrelation. The possibility of a serious ﬁnancial crisis during this period provides
an explanation for negative autocorrelation. Some empirical evidence is provided for this
explanation.
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The random character of asset returns is the foundation of modern ﬁnancial economics.
The random walk hypothesis remains an important starting point in understanding the nature
of asset returns, even though it is neither necessary nor su$cient for market e$ciency. Lo and
MacKinlay (1988, 1990) provided the seminal empirical test of the random walk hypothesis.
They found that the random walk hypothesis has been clearly rejected for U.S. market indexes,
and that cross-autocorrelation among size-sorted portfolios is responsible for a substantial
proportion of the positive autocorrelations observed for the market index.
The question is whether positive autocorrelation in market index returns and cross-
autocorrelation of size portfolios behind them are universal phenomena. This paper investi-
gates Japanese stock market data for autocorrelations and cross-autocorrelations of size-sorted
portfolios as a source of index autocorrelations. Among previous studies, Chang, McQueen,
and Pinegar (1999) used monthly PACAP data to carefully analyze and ﬁnd evidence of the
lead-and-lag relations among size-sorted portfolios in Asian stock markets, including the
Tokyo market. However, they did not investigate the implications for market index autocor-
relation. On the other hand, recent evidence, for example in Mitsui (2000) and Kim (2002),
suggests there is no signiﬁcant autocorrelation in popular Japanese market indexes such as
TOPIX and Nikkei 225. This paper closely follows Lo and MacKinlay’s (1988, 1990)
empirical procedure to reconcile previous results and shows, in fact, that the cross-
autocorrelation structure of size-sorted portfolios in the Japanese market resembles that in the
U.S. market. It is argued that popular Japanese market indexes put much more weight on large
stocks than the CRSP indexes examined by Lo and MacKinlay. Therefore, if the market index
equivalent to CRSP is constructed for Japanese market data, the random walk hypothesis will
be rejected. However, I also show that such a cross-autocorrelation structure became unstable
in the second half of the 1990s, and the fact that the largest stocks began to exhibit negative
autocorrelations in the recent period is the major source of this change. I also provide some
explanation of the change in the stochastic character of stock returns in recent years.
The data used in this study is weekly data that covers all listed stocks in the ﬁrst and
second sections of the Tokyo stock exchange, which includes six times more individual stocks
than the monthly PACAP data used by Chang, McQueen, and Pinegar (1999). Hence this is
the ﬁrst comprehensive study of the random walk hypothesis using Japanese data, conducted
in a way directly comparable with recent studies of the U.S. market.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data
and discusses deﬁnitions of market indexes. In Section III, we study autocorrelation of stock
market indexes and size-sorted portfolios in the Japanese market. We also examine cross-
autocorrelations of size-sorted portfolios. In Section IV, we examine the same issues discussed
in Sections III, but concentrate on the period after 1995. Section V concludes the paper.
II. Stock Market Data and Di#erent Market Indexes
Among the current literature on empirical testing of the random walk hypothesis, Lo and
MacKinlay’s work (1988) is the seminal benchmark. They found that the random walk
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June 30hypothesis has been clearly rejected for CRSP market index returns using weekly data. In the
update of Lo and MacKinlay’s original ﬁndings (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997, Table
2.4), they reported that the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of equal-weighted CRSP return indexes
was 17.6% for daily data and 1.5 %f or weekly data for the sample period from 1962 to 1994.
Similarly, Foster and Nelson (1996) reported the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of S&P 500 index
returns to be around 6% in the daily sample spans from 1928 to 1990. On the other hand,
recent evidence on Japanese data, reported for example in Mitsui (2000) and Kim (2002),
suggests there is no signiﬁcant autocorrelation in popular Japanese market indexes such as
TOPIX and Nikkei 225.
1 These researchers are more interested in applying statistical models
of time-varying volatility to the Japanese market. They tested routinely for autocorrelation,
and so did not pursue the meaning of their test results. In the ﬁrst half of the next section, I
re-examine carefully the random walk hypothesis for Japanese market index returns following
the methodology of Lo and MacKinlay (1988, 1999). In the latter half of the next section,
cross-autocorrelations of size-sorted portfolios and their e#ects on autocorrelation of market
index returns are also investigated.
The Japanese stock market data used in this paper are the market index TOPIX and
size-sorted portfolios of the Tokyo stock exchange. TOPIX is the value-weighted index of
individual stocks listed in the ﬁrst section of the Tokyo stock exchange. The size-sorted
portfolio data here are the indexes of three size-based portfolios of the ﬁrst section, which are
referred to as Large, Medium, and Small, and the index of the second section, referred to as
Second-section, all published by the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Throughout this paper, Second-
section is treated as the smallest size portfolio. Even though second section stocks are on
average much smaller than ﬁrst section stocks, whether an individual stock will belong to the
ﬁrst section or to the second section is, to some extent, decided by the choice of an individual
ﬁrm. In that sense, the di#erence between the Second-section portfolio and the other three
portfolios are not strictly based on constituent ﬁrm size alone. However, as will become
apparent in the following analysis, this grouping of portfolios seems to be appropriate and
mostly consistent with size-based sorting, judging from the patterns of autocorrelation and
cross-autocorrelations. There is a quantitatively small, but very persistent, di#erence between
the behaviors of Small-size and Second-section portfolios. The latter behaves unambiguously
like a portfolio smaller than the former. The di#erences between Second-section and the two
larger portfolios in the ﬁrst section are much more signiﬁcant.
The sample period of original data spans from January 1, 1968 to August 15, 2001.
Following Lo and MacKinlay, a weekly return is deﬁned by continuously compounded returns
from Wednesday in one week to Wednesday in the following week. If Wednesday data is
missing, Tuesday data is used instead. If both Tuesday and Wednesday data are missing,
Thursday data is used. If all three days’ data are missing, the return from that week is not
reported. As a result, we obtained 1,715 weekly returns in the period from the ﬁrst week of
January 1968 to the second week of August 2001. Their basic statistics are summarized in
Table 1.
In comparing Japanese market index returns to those of the U.S., it is important to take
1 There are other studies in which the random walk hypothesis is tested, but the main focus is the application of
new statistical techniques to detect autocorrelations. Such papers include Kariya and Terui (1997), Kariya et al.
(1995), and Kishimoto (1995).
2007] HID8@ >C9:M 6JID8DGG:A6I>DC 6C9 8GDHH-6JID8DGG:A6I>DCH D; H>O:-HDGI:9 EDGI;DA>DH 31into account the di#erence in deﬁnitions of stock market indexes. Nikkei 225 and TOPIX are
the most popular Japanese market indexes and they have also been used in academic studies.
As noted above, TOPIX is the value-weighted index of the ﬁrst section of the Tokyo stock
exchange, while Nikkei 225 is the equal-weighted index of selected stocks from the ﬁrst section.
However, Lo and MacKinlay (1988) used CRSP indexes which cover all listed stocks in
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. Therefore CRSP indexes cover a broader range of individual
stocks, in particular more small stocks, than Japanese indexes. In other words, both Nikkei 225
and TOPIX are expected to be less sensitive to the behaviors of small stocks than the CRSP
index. The di#erence between TOPIX and Nikkei 225 is not as obvious. While TOPIX puts
more weight on larger stocks, Nikkei 225 covers far fewer stocks, and its coverage concen-
trates on the largest stocks. Hence, we cannot tell which index would be more sensitive to the
T67A: 1. B6H>8 SI6I>HI>8H
Summary statistics of continuously compounded weekly returns (in percentages) of market indexes and size-sorted
portfolios of the Japanese stock market (Tokyo stock exchange), over the sample period from the ﬁrst week of
January 1968 to the second week of August 2001. The number of observations for each time series is 1,715. The
number of stocks reported for size portfolios are as of August 2001. Skewness and excess kurtosis marked with
(**) and (*) indicate that they are statistically di#erent from zero at the 1% and 5% levels of signiﬁcance,















TOPIX 0.137 2.31 0.33** 3.49** 12.51 13.41
[0.00] [0.00]
First Section 0.137 2.19 0.50** 4.28** 13.57 13.11
[0.00] [0.00]
Market Average 0.143 2.15 0.50** 3.87** 12.64 12.53
[0.00] [0.00]











Large 0.136 2.40 0.21** 3.23** 11.77 13.39 613
[0.00] [0.00]
Medium 0.132 2.31 0.50** 4.56** 14.60 13.92 515
[0.00] [0.00]
Small 0.144 2.33 0.42** 4.33** 14.90 12.27 344
[0.00] [0.00]
Second section
Second-section 0.165 2.38 0.12* 2.99** 12.21 10.91 580
[0.04] [0.00]
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June 32movements of larger stocks. In this paper, we take TOPIX as representative of the Japanese
market index as its criterion for selecting individual stocks is known to be mechanical and
more transparent than that of the Nikkei 225.
These di#erences in the deﬁnition of stock market indexes are particularly important as
Lo and MacKinlay (1988) argue that the rejection of the random walk hypothesis for CRSP
indexes is due to the behaviors of small stocks. They found stronger rejection for the
equal-weighted CRSP index than for the value-weighted index. Obviously the equal-weighted
index is more sensitive to the behaviors of small stocks than the value-weighted index. The
random walk hypothesis is also rejected more strongly for smaller size-sorted portfolios than
for larger portfolios. In their subsequent work, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) showed that there
exist lead-lag relations running from larger size portfolios to smaller size portfolios, and that
such relations generate autocorrelations in market index returns.
Given such ﬁndings about the U.S. market, we also use a couple of heuristic market
indexes deﬁned as follows, to identify the signiﬁcance of di#erences in deﬁnitions.
First Section SmallMediumLarge
3
Market Average SmallMediumLargeSecond Section
4
They are not market indexes in a proper sense, but the behaviors of these “pseudo” market
indexes are expected to be more sensitive to small stock returns and would be closer to those
of the CRSP indexes. Their basic statistics also are reported in Table 1.
III. Autocorrelations in Stock Market Indexes and Size-sorted Portfolios
First, we tested the random walk hypothesis for the market indexes and size-sorted
portfolios of the Japanese market. Table 2 shows the results for market indexes. Panel (A) of
Table 2 shows the evidence based on correlation coe$cients and Ljung-Box Q statistics.
The ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of TOPIX reported in Table 2 is only 2.2%. In the
corresponding table, Table 2.4, Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) report 20.3% ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation for the equal-weighted CRSP index and 1.5% for the value-weighted index for
weekly U.S. data from July 1962 to December 1994. TOPIX therefore seems to be behaving
more like the value-weighted CRSP index than like the equal-weighted index. At the same
time, autocorrelations of First-section are higher than those of TOPIX in all lag lengths, while
those of Market Average are even higher. Test results based on Q statistics suggest the same
ﬁndings. We found statistically signiﬁcant autocorrelations in all three stock market indexes,
and that the signiﬁcance of Q statistics gets stronger in order from TOPIX, then First-section
and Market Average. This is consistent with our discussion in the previous section: First-section
and Market Average are supposed to be more sensitive to the behaviors of smaller stocks than
TOPIX in that order.
Panel Bo f Table 2 shows the results of a variance ratio test. The z(q) statistics reported
in Table 2 and other tables in this paper are Lo and MacKinlay’s (1988) heteroscedasticity-
consistent test statistics which asymptotically follow the standard normal distribution under
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TOPIX is not statistically signiﬁcant, except that the variance ratios are consistent with the
values of autocorrelations and Ljung-Box Q statistics. The variance ratio becomes higher and
the rejection of random walk becomes stronger in order from TOPIX, then First Section, and
Market Average.
Table 3 reports the test results of Q statistics and the variance ratio test for size-sorted
portfolios. The autocorrelation becomes higher in order from Large, then Medium, Small, and
Second-section. The same pattern is observed for the statistical signiﬁcance of Q statistics and
z(q) statistics. Once again, the results are consistent with the ﬁndings of Lo and MacKinlay
discussed in the previous section. Also, both Q statistics and the variance ratio test do not
reject the random walk for Large-size and Medium-size portfolios. These ﬁndings coincide
with the results for market index returns in Table 2.
I examined various subsamples to check the robustness of the above empirical results. The
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Tests of autocorrelation in Japanese market index returns for the sample period from the ﬁrst week of January
1968 to the second week of August 2001.
Panel A Panel A: Autocorrelation coe$cients r ˆ i (in percent) and Ljung-Box Q statistics Q « i for i5,10. Under the null
hypothesis of no autocorrelation up to order i, Ljung-Box Qi statistics follows chi-square distribution, c
2
i.







In parentheses under variance ratios are z statistics, deﬁned by z(q)nqM «r(q)/q «, where nq is the number of
observations and q «is the asymptotic variance of M «r(q) deﬁned by equation (2.1.20) in Lo and MacKinlay (1999).
Under the null hypothesis of the random walk, z(q) asymptotically follows the standard normal distribution.
Statistics marked with (**) and (*) indicate that they are statistically signiﬁcant at 1% and 5% level, respectively,
rejecting the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.
Panel A: Autocorrelation coe$cients and Q statistics
r ˆ 1 r ˆ 2 r ˆ 3 r ˆ 4 Q « 5 Q « 10
TOPIX 2.2 1.6 7.9 1.0 13.5* 20.6**
First Section 8.0 4.3 9.1 1.7 29.3** 37.0**
Market Average 11.9 6.1 10.7 3.3 54.2** 63.0**
Panel B: Variance ratios
Number q of base observations aggregated
to form variance ratio
248 1 6
TOPIX 1.02 1.09 1.19 1.30
[0.45] [1.06] [1.54] [1.75]
First Section 1.08 1.21 1.35 1.46
[1.58] [2.40]* [2.73]** [2.68]**
Market Average 1.12 1.30 1.50 1.66
[2.41]* [3.44]** [3.94]** [3.88]**
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June +**variance ratio test never rejects the random walk hypothesis for TOPIX and Large-size
portfolios. On the other hand, the rejection based on Ljung-Box Q statistics was found to be
heavily inﬂuenced by the ﬁrst 300 to 400 observations of the sample. Since the 400th
observation corresponds to the last week of August 1975, the observations before and during
the ﬁrst oil crisis strongly a#ect the rejection of our hypothesis based on Q statistics. This is not
surprising as the period from 1968-74 included major economic events such as the collapse of
the ﬁxed exchange rate regime, the ﬁrst oil crisis, and a high inﬂation period in early 1970s.
These events were not speciﬁc to Japan, but hit the Japanese economy much harder than they
did other developed economies.
We repeated the tests in Tables 2 and 3 using the subsamples starting from 1975. The
results reported in Table 4 are the main ﬁndings of the analysis in this section. For the sample
after the oil crisis, neither Q statistics nor the variance ratio test rejected the random walk for
TOPIX and Large-size portfolio. Further, the variance ratio test does not reject the random
walk hypothesis for the Medium-size portfolio either. For the pseudo indexes, First Section and
Market Average, the rejection of the random walk is a little weaker in Table 4. However, both
Q statistics and the variance ratio test do reject the random walk for the smaller portfolios. The
autocorrelations of Small-size and Second-section also remained high and were not so di#erent
from the full sample values reported in Table 3.
In summary, there is only remote evidence for autocorrelation in TOPIX and Large-size
portfolio returns. This conﬁrms the results reported in Mitsui (2000) and Kim (2002) using
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Autocorrelation coe$cients, Ljung-Box Q statistics, and variance ratios of size-sorted portfolio returns for the
sample period from the ﬁrst week of January 1968 to the second week of August 2001. See notes in Tables 1 and 2
for deﬁnitions of size-sorted portfolios and test statistics. Statistics marked with (**) and (*) indicate that they are
statistically signiﬁcant at 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Panel A: Autocorrelation coe$cients and Q statistics
r ˆ 1 r ˆ 2 r ˆ 3 r ˆ 4 Q « 5 Q « 10
Large 1.6 1.5 7.7 1.4 13.0* 18.2*
Medium 5.9 2.9 8.9 0.4 21.2** 28.7**
Small 18.1 9.4 10.0 5.2 93.6** 99.4**
Second-section 17.3 10.8 13.9 5.8 119.3** 132.4**
Panel B: Variance ratios
Number q of base observations aggregated
to form variance ratio
248 1 6
Large 1.02 1.08 1.18 1.30
[0.33] [0.94] [1.49] [1.72]
Medium 1.06 1.17 1.25 1.30
[1.18] [1.86] [1.97]* [1.75]
Small 1.18 1.42 1.66 1.81
[3.53]** [4.75]** [5.09]** [4.64]**
Second-section 1.17 1.44 1.77 2.06
[3.58]** [5.38]** [6.27]** [6.20]**
2007] HID8@ >C9:M 6JID8DGG:A6I>DC 6C9 8GDHH-6JID8DGG:A6I>DCH D; H>O:-HDGI:9 EDGI;DA>DH +*+more recent data. On the other hand, the random walk hypothesis is rejected for two
additional indexes deﬁned in this paper, First Section and Market Average, which put more
weight on small stocks than TOPIX. Finally, strong positive autocorrelations are found and
the random walk is rejected for Medium-size, Small-size, and Second-section portfolios.
Autocorrelation becomes stronger in that order. These results suggest that if the equal-weight
index that covers both the ﬁrst and the second section of the Tokyo exchange is constructed,
such that it is directly comparable with the CRSP equal-weight index, the random walk will be
rejected for that index. Given this analysis and the fact that the autocorrelations are stronger
for smaller portfolios, the pattern of stock return autocorrelations in the Japanese market is
very similar to that of the U.S. market reported in Lo and MacKinlay (1988, 1999).
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Autocorrelation coe$cients, Ljung-Box Q statistics, and variance ratios of market indexes and size-sorted
portfolios, for the sample period from the ﬁrst week of January 1975 to the second week of August 2001. The
number of observations is 1,347. See notes in Tables 1 and 2 for deﬁnitions of the variables and test statistics.
Statistics marked with (**) and (*) indicate that they are statistically signiﬁcant at 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Panel A: Autocorrelation coe$cients and Q statistics
r ˆ 1 r ˆ 2 r ˆ 3 r ˆ 4 Q « 5 Q « 10
TOPIX 1.3 4.0 5.5 2.1 9.0 14.3
First Section 5.3 7.4 7.0 1.0 18.9** 23.8**
Market Average 9.6 9.2 8.9 1.2 37.3** 42.4**
Large 1.8 3.6 5.3 1.9 8.6 12.9
Medium 3.7 6.4 7.1 3.0 16.1** 21.2*
Small 17.3 13.1 9.5 3.9 78.3** 81.1**
Second-section 17.1 13.0 13.8 5.7 102.9** 112.9**
Panel B: Variance ratios
Number q of base observations aggregated
to form variance ratio
248 1 6
TOPIX 0.99 1.05 1.11 1.15
[0.24] [0.49] [0.76] [0.79]
First Section 1.05 1.19 1.30 1.35
[0.92] [1.88] [2.01]* [1.74]*
Market Average 1.10 1.28 1.46 1.58
[1.75] [2.89]** [3.19]** [2.91]**
Large 0.98 1.04 1.10 1.15
[0.33] [0.38] [0.70] [0.76]
Medium 1.04 1.16 1.23 1.24
[0.65] [1.53] [1.53] [1.17]
Small 1.17 1.44 1.68 1.79
[2.99]** [4.38]** [4.54]** [3.87]**
Second-section 1.17 1.46 1.81 2.11
[3.19]** [4.99]** [5.75]** [5.58]**
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June +*,IV. Cross-autocorrelations of Size-sorted Portfolios
Next, we examined cross-autocorrelations and lead-lag relations among size-sorted port-
folios of the Tokyo market. For this purpose, let us consider the vector of four size-sorted
portfolio returns Xt[R1t R2t R3t R4t]
, where R1t is the return of the Second-section portfolio
and R2t, R3t, R4t are the returns of Small, Medium, and Large-size portfolios, respectively.
In Table 5, the correlation matrix of weekly size-sorted portfolio returns vector U «(0) and
kth order cross-autocorrelation matrices U «(k) are shown.
2 In the matrices shown in Table 5,
2 The results for the subsample after the oil crisis, 1975-2001, are very similar to the full sample results in Table
5.
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Autocorrelation matrices of the vector of size-sorted portfolio returns, Xt[R1t R2t R3t R4t]
. Rits are simple





Sample period is from the ﬁrst week of January 1968 to the second week August 2001. The k-th order








the (i, j) element of U(k) corresponds to the correlation between Ritk and Rjt. Under the null of multivariate IID,
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for U «(0) which is a symmetric matrix by deﬁnition. Let us consider U «(1) for example: The
correlation between Large-size portfolio last week (R4t1)a n dSecond-section portfolio this
week (R1t)i nU «(1) is 13.3%. However, the correlation between Second-section portfolio last
week (R4t)a n dLarge-size portfolio this week (R1t1) is only 2.8%. The latter is not
statistically signiﬁcant if multivariate IID returns are assumed for the null hypothesis. Such
asymmetry in cross-autocorrelations imply a lead-lag relation running from Large-size portfo-
lios to Second-section portfolios. This will become more apparent if we calculate the di#erence
between U «(k) and its transpose. The results are shown in Table 6. For all U «(k), the entries
below the diagonals are positive, even though the values are a little smaller than those reported
in Table 2.9 of Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). This means that the correlations
between smaller portfolios today and larger portfolios in the past are always higher rather than
the other way around. The values become smaller as the number of lags k becomes larger.
However, the same lead-lag pattern is still observed.
This kind of cross-autocorrelation structure can account for a substantial proportion of
observed auto-correlation in the market indexes such as Market Average and First Section that
put more weight on small stocks than TOPIX. Such a mechanism behind index autocorrelation
is the same as in the U.S. market, ﬁrst pointed out by Lo and MacKinlay (1988, 1990).
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Di#erences between autocorrelation matrices and their transposes for the vector of size-sorted portfolio returns.





















































































































































=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June +*.V. Recent Changes in the Autocorrelation Structure of the Japanese Market
Since the early 1990s, the Japanese economy and the Japanese stock market have been
trapped in ﬁnancial turmoil. In this section, we investigate whether or not the patterns of
Japanese stock returns discussed in the previous two sections have changed during the recent
years of serious ﬁnancial trouble.
It is not immediately obvious at what point the fragility of the Japanese ﬁnancial system
really became a serious concern. Here, we examine the subsample starting from 1995.
However, the points made in the following discussion remain una#ected as long as the
subsample begins after January 1995.
In Table 7, autocorrelation is tested for the sample starting from the ﬁrst week of January
1995. Surprisingly, in Table 7, most autocorrelations of TOPIX and Large-size portfolio are
negative. This is in sharp contrast to the full sample result in Table 1, in which positive
autocorrelations are found for TOPIX and Large-size portfolio returns. In particular, the
ﬁrst-order autocorrelations are not only negative, but also four or ﬁve times larger than the
numbers in Tables 3 and 4 in absolute value. Even though Q statistics are not signiﬁcant, given
the fact that all autocorrelations take a positive sign in the full sample, this ﬁnding is di$cult
to dismiss. For smaller portfolios, on the other hand, we ﬁnd a similar pattern of autocorrela-
tion as in the full sample results in Tables 3 and 4. Even though the persistence of
autocorrelation is lower than in the full sample and is not statistically signiﬁcant, autocorrela-
tions of Small-size and Second-section portfolios are still positive. Also, autocorrelations
gradually decay as the lag-length becomes higher, as for the full sample results.
Since the structure of autocorrelations is unstable for the recent subsample, it is not
di$cult to imagine that the cross-autocorrelations and lead-lag relations between size portfo-
lios have also become unstable. In Table 8, the cross-autocorrelation matrices of size-sorted
portfolios are tabulated for the post-1995 subsample. Comparing Table 8 with Tables 5 and 6,
no signiﬁcant di#erence is detected for the contemporaneous correlation matrix U «(0). How-
ever, in Table 8, the pattern of lead-lag relations running from larger size portfolios to smaller
is no longer clear.
To investigate the nature of recent changes in the autocorrelation structure of the market
index and Large-size portfolios, we estimated a couple of univariate time series models. The









Using such a speciﬁcation, we wanted to examine whether the sign of the previous week’s
innovation a#ects the correlation between the returns in the current week and in the previous
week. For example, if b2 was negative and signiﬁcant, it implies that a negative shock tends to
cause negative correlation, hence a negative innovation tends to be followed by an o#setting
positive innovation the following week. If both positive and negative shocks generate negative
autocorrelation, b1 will be negatively signiﬁcant and b2 will be insigniﬁcant.
Estimation results of AR(1) model in equation (1) are shown in Table 9. We report only
2007] HID8@ >C9:M 6JID8DGG:A6I>DC 6C9 8GDHH-6JID8DGG:A6I>DCH D; H>O:-HDGI:9 EDGI;DA>DH +*/AR(1) results, but adding more lags did not change the basic results; AR coe$cients of the
second and higher lags were statistically insigniﬁcant. Panel A of Table 9 shows the results of
the ordinary AR(1) model without a dummy variable. In these results, no parameter estimates
of b1 are statistically signiﬁcant, conﬁrming that there is no autocorrelation found for TOPIX
and Large-size portfolios in the full sample. In the recent subsample, the estimates of b1 take
relatively large negative values, but they remain statistically insigniﬁcant.
In the speciﬁcation that includes a dummy variable, reported in Panel B, the estimated b1
are all positive in both subsamples, though none are statistically signiﬁcant. On the other hand,
the estimates of b2 are all negative. They are statistically signiﬁcant even for the recent
subsample, at 5% level for TOPIX and at 10% level for the Large-size portfolios. The b2
estimates for the recent subsample are more than twice as large in absolute value than those for
the earlier subsample. In Panel C, the structural break at the end of 1994 is directly tested by
T67A: 7. T:HI>C< AJID8DGG:A6I>DCH ;DG I=: S6BEA: 6;I:G 1995
Autocorrelation coe$cients, Ljung-Box Q statistics, and variance ratios of market indexes and size-sorted
portfolios for the sample period from the ﬁrst week of January 1995 to the second week of August 2001. The
number of observations is 368. See Tables 2 and 3 for deﬁnitions of variables and test statistics. Statistics marked
with (**) and (*) indicate that they are statistically signiﬁcant at 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Panel A: Autocorrelation coe$cients and Q statistics
r ˆ 1 r ˆ 2 r ˆ 3 r ˆ 4 Q « 5 Q « 10
TOPIX 8.1 0.5 4.2 4.0 9.1 12.1
First Section 0.6 2.7 8.2 2.9 7.7 12.7
Market Average 3.7 4.7 9.6 0.2 10.2 18.5*
Large 9.2 0.5 3.3 3.9 9.2 11.7
Medium 1.8 0.3 9.1 7.3 10.8 15.1
Small 11.6 9.4 10.6 1.4 13.2* 21.2*
Second Section 9.1 8.5 13.3 3.4 16.8** 36.1**
Panel B: Variance ratios
Number q of base observations aggregated
to form variance ratio
248 1 6
TOPIX 0.92 0.89 0.93 0.94
[0.94] [0.77] [0.35] [0.21]
First Section 0.99 1.05 1.15 1.20
[0.09] [0.35] [0.67] [0.64]
Market Average 1.03 1.14 1.29 1.44
[0.38] [0.97] [1.32] [1.39]
Large 0.91 0.87 0.89 0.90
[1.05] [0.90] [0.50] [0.34]
Medium 0.98 1.01 1.07 1.10
[0.24] [0.07] [0.30] [0.33]
Small 1.11 1.32 1.53 1.67
[1.06] [1.92]* [2.04]* [1.88]
Second Section 1.09 1.28 1.52 1.87
[0.91] [1.74] [2.07]* [2.41]*
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June +*0the simple Chow test and by the bootstrap test for b2. Both tests suggest there was a structural
change in the autocorrelation structure of stock returns at the end of 1994 and the beginning
of 1995. These results imply that since the second half of the 1990s, negative innovations in
stock returns have been likely to create negative autocorrelation. This means that when there
is a negative shock in the market, we would expect to see a rebound in the following week.
However, positive shocks will not create such a tendency.
A complete investigation of the source of the recent changes in autocorrelation structure
is beyond the scope of this study. However, we can suggest some possible interpretations. First,
the empirical results in Tables 7 and 9 can be considered evidence that Japanese investors have
become very sensitive to, and overreact to, negative news during a period of serious ﬁnancial
trouble. A slightly di#erent interpretation that we would prefer to the ﬁrst, is a variation of
T67A: 8. CGDHH-6JID8DGG:A6I>DCH D; S>O:-HDGI:9 PDGI;DA>DH
>C I=: SJ7H6BEA: 6;I:G 1995
Autocorrelation matrices U(k) , and di#erences between U(k) and their transposes, U «(k)U «
(k). U(k)i s
autocorrelation matrices of Xt[R1t R2t R3t R4t]
, where Rit are simple returns of size-sorted portfolios. Sample
period is from the ﬁrst week of January 1995 to the second week of August 2001 and the number of observations
is 368. See Table 5 for detailed deﬁnitions of variables. Under the null of multivariate IID, asymptotic standard
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AR(1) models are estimated for continuously compounded weekly returns of TOPIX and Large-size portfolio, for
the following subsamples:
Jan 75-Dec 94: The 1st week of January 1975 to the last week of December 1994 (992 obs.).
Jan 95-Aug 01: The 1st week of January 1995 to the 2nd week of August 2001 (368 obs.).
We ﬁrst estimated an ordinary AR(1) model as the benchmark. We also estimated the extended AR(1) model








In parentheses under parameter estimates, heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors of White (1980) are reported.
Estimated coe$cients marked with (**), (*) and () indicate that they are statistically di#erent from zero at the
1%, 5%, and 10% signiﬁcance level respectively.
In Panel C, we tested for the structural break at the end of 1994. In addition to the ordinary Chow test,
which assumes normal disturbances, we also tested for a structural break by bootstrap: From the Jan 75-Dec 94
subsample, 5,000 replications, each with 368 observations corresponding to the post-1995 sample size, are drawn.
The extended AR(1) model was then estimated for each draw. Under the null hypothesis that b2 in the latter
subsample (Jan 95-Aug 01) is same as in the earlier subsample (Jan 75-Dec 94), we calculate the probability that
the parameter estimate of b2 will be equal to or smaller than the actual b « 2 estimated from the latter subsample.
Panel A: Benchmark case, AR(1) with no dummy variable (b20).
TOPIX Large-size Portfolio
Jan 75-Dec 94 Jan 95-Aug 01 Jan 75-Dec 94 Jan 95-Aug 01
b « 1 0.023 0.082 b « 1 0.018 0.092
[S.E.] [0.051] [0.062] [S.E.] [0.051] [0.062]
R
2 0.1 0.7 R
2 0.0 0.9
R …
2 0.0 0.4 R …
2 0.1 0.6
Panel B: Di#erent responses to past innovations of di#erent signs.
TOPIX Large-size Portfolio
Jan 75-Dec 94 Jan 95-Aug 01 Jan 75-Dec 94 Jan 95-Aug 01
b « 1 0.115
 0.108 b « 1 0.096 0.077
[S.E.] [0.066] [0.109] [S.E.] [0.064] [0.109]
b « 2 0.179 0.402* b « 2 0.158 0.358

[S.E.] [0.138] [0.192] [S.E.] [0.138] [0.197]
R
2 0.5 2.3 R
2 0.4 2.1
R …
2 0.3 1.7 R …
2 0.2 1.6
Panel C: Tests of structural break at the end of 1994 in the extended AR(1) model.
TOPIX Large-size Portfolio
F(3,1340)2.52 F(3,1340)2.21
Chow test [0.06] [0.08]
Bootstrap p[b2,7594b « 2,9401]0.04 p[b2,7594b « 2,9401]0.05
p[b2,7594b2,9401]Probability that the estimated b2 will be smaller than b « 2,9401 estimated from the later
subsample under the null hypothesis that b2 are the same in both subsamples.
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June +*2“the peso problem.”
3 If negative news, such as the consecutive failures of large ﬁnancial
institutions in the winter of 1997, hits the market, it creates fear of a complete meltdown of the
ﬁnancial system. The probability of such a catastrophic event is very small. However, since the
potential damage is so large, the stock market drops sharply. Eventually, the fear of immediate
crisis will become remote and stock prices will recover. This will create signiﬁcant negative
autocorrelation in the stock returns. Since the price of risk would rise sharply when signiﬁcant
negative news hits the market, observed negative autocorrelation is consistent with the
rationality of investors. Unlike the peso problem in the foreign exchange rate literature, the
possibility of a catastrophic event arises only occasionally, but arises sharply. This creates
temporal negative shocks followed by recovery in the market.
Given the above interpretations, it is straightforward to examine whether negative
economic and ﬁnancial shocks induce negative autocorrelation in stock returns. A typical
example of such a negative event is the “March crisis” that has been repeated in Japan year
after year since the late 1990s. The popular explanation of the“March crisis” is: The
accounting year of the majority of Japanese ﬁrms ends in March. Hence, the decline of stock
prices toward the end of March creates concern among investors about the balance sheets of
Japanese ﬁrms that hold many other ﬁrms’ shares by cross-holdings. The public’s fear that a
stock price decline will trigger the failure of major ﬁrms and ﬁnancial institutions puts even
further downward pressure on stock prices. Such a process creates a vicious circle between
investors’ expectations and stock prices. As March ends, this negative concern also ends and
the downward pressure on stock prices disappears. Stock prices therefore rise as April begins
and this creates a negative autocorrelation after negative shocks.
To examine the e#ect of the “March crisis,” another dummy variable is added to the AR














last three weeks of March
otherwise
If the “March crisis” is a major source of negative autocorrelation, b3 will be negative and
statistically signiﬁcant. Table 10 shows the estimation results of equation (3) for TOPIX and
Large-size portfolio returns. As expected, b3 estimates take negative values and are highly
signiﬁcant in the post-1995 subsample. In addition, we estimated the same model for the
subsample beginning from 1999, because the serious ﬁnancial trouble that started in the winter
of 1997 had come to an end, at least temporarily, by the end of 1998. In the estimates for the
later and shorter subsample 1999-2001, b2 estimates are smaller and b3 estimates are larger than
in the 1995-2001 subsample. Therefore, after the series of ﬁnancial troubles of individual
ﬁnancial institutions had been contained, the “March crisis” became a dominant source of
negative autocorrelation in TOPIX and Large-size portfolio returns in recent years.
3 Fankel and Froot (1987, p. 139) wrote “the peso problem arises when there is a small probability of a large
change in the exchange rate each period — such as results from a devaluation, a bursting of a speculative bubble,
or a big change in fundamentals — and when the sample size is not large enough to invoke the central limit
theorem with conﬁdence.”
2007] HID8@ >C9:M 6JID8DGG:A6I>DC 6C9 8GDHH-6JID8DGG:A6I>DCH D; H>O:-HDGI:9 EDGI;DA>DH +*3The empirical results in Table 10 will not completely rule out other potential explana-
tions.
4 Overall, however, the evidence is consistent with “the peso problem” interpretation of
4 A possible explanation worth considering is the combination of the leverage e#ect and the volatility feed back
e#ect. In ARCH model literature, negative innovations in returns drive up volatility more than positive innova-
tions (the leverage e#ect). It is widely believed that larger conditional volatility should increase expected returns
(volatility feedback or GARCH-in-mean e#ect), even though there is much less evidence for this than for the
leverage e#ect. Therefore the causality of “negative shock  higher volatility  higher expected return” creates
negative autocorrelation, if the negative shocks are concentrated. We examined weekly data used in this paper, but
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We estimate the extended AR(1) model with additional dummy variable qt for the last three weeks of March and












last three weeks of March
otherwise
In parentheses under parameter estimates, the heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors of White (1980) are
reported. Estimated coe$cients marked with (**), (*) and () indicate that they are statistically di#erent from
zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% signiﬁcance level respectively. The above model is estimated for continuously
compounded weekly returns of TOPIX and Large-size portfolio for the following subsamples:
Jan 75-Dec 94: The 1st week of January 1975 to the last week of December 1994 (992 obs.).
Jan 95-Aug 01: The 1st week of January 1995 to the 2nd week of August 2001 (368 obs.).
Jan 99-Aug 01: The 1st week of January 1999 to the 2nd week of August 2001 (138 obs.).
TOPIX
Jan 75-Dec 94 Jan 95-Aug 01 Jan 99-Aug 01
b « 1 0.093 0.104 0.125
[S.E.] [0.056] [0.109] [0.195]
b « 2 0.187 0.324
 0.188
[S.E.] [0.113] [0.184] [0.298]
b « 3 0.333 0.943** 1.361**
[S.E.] [0.272] [0.236] [0.158]
R
2 0.9 5.2 9.3
R …
2 0.7 4.3 7.2
Large-size Portfolio
Jan 75-Dec 94 Jan 95-Aug 01 Jan 99-Aug 01
b « 1 0.075 0.072 0.117
[S.E.] [0.056] [0.108] [0.194]
b « 2 0.166 0.279 0.157
[S.E.] [0.113] [0.189] [0.297]
b « 3 0.320 0.960** 1.353**
[S.E.] [0.280] [0.237] [0.187]
R
2 0.8 5.1 9.1
R …
2 0.5 4.2 7.0
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June ++*observed negative autocorrelation in the recent Japanese stock market, which emphasizes the
role of possible serious, but unrealized, ﬁnancial panics.
VI. Conclusions
This paper has re-examined the nature of market index autocorrelations and cross-
autocorrelation of size portfolios generating index correlations in the Japanese market. No
autocorrelation was found for TOPIX, the value-weighted index of the ﬁrst-section of the
Tokyo stock exchange. However, other evidence suggests that if an index were constructed so
as to put more weight on smaller stocks, as for the equal-weighted CRSP index, the random
walk hypothesis will be rejected for that index. There are also cross-autocorrelations among
size-sorted portfolios which create lead-lag relations running from larger portfolios to smaller
ones. In these respects, the structure of the Japanese market is very similar to the U.S. market.
However, such autocorrelation and cross-autocorrelation structures have become unsta-
ble since the second half of the 1990s. The largest size portfolio, and TOPIX itself, began to
exhibit negative autocorrelations in the recent sample, and lead-lag relations among size
portfolios disappeared. We suggest the possibility that ﬁnancial panic, which occasionally
increased very sharply during this period, will explain negative autocorrelation in Large
portfolio and TOPIX. Some supporting evidence is provided using the so-called “March
crisis.” Another paper is required to investigate this issue fully. Such an analysis will also open
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